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I believe that the most important task for philosophers of the generation Philip 
Goff and I belong to is that of discrediting, once and for all, the metaphysic of 
physicalism. In a collection called The Waning of Materialism (aka physicalism), 
the editors provide an impressive list of major philosophers – from the period in 
which physicalism was supposed to have achieved hegemony, to the present in 
which it is supposed to possess it – all of whom reject, or have very serious doubts 
about, physicalism (Koons and Bealer 2010: ix). A little reflection upon that list 
makes it plain that the big players, in the main, have not in fact been physicalists. 
After looking at some of the problems with physicalism, the editors go on to say 
that, 
 
it is natural to predict that, among the major mature philosophers in the 
future, a significant portion (perhaps sometimes a majority) will reject 
materialism. Even among those who start out as materialists in their youth, 
a significant number are likely to end up doubting materialism’s ultimate 
viability or suspecting that the materialism / anti-materialism debate is 
moot, and in either case recognizing that some versions of anti-materialism 
have rational credentials at least as good as materialism’s. Thus, even 
though it is likely that in future the ranks of materialists will continue to see 
new recruits, especially among newcomers to philosophy, the character of 
the problems facing materialism will continue to inspire very serious doubt. 
If this is the case, materialism will in one respect continue to wax; in 
another it will continue to wane. (ibid.: xxi) 
 
Not good enough; this prediction needs to be falsified. We do not need more 
protracted waxing and waning, but rather a swift, clean and decisive break. It 
would do the discipline a world of good; both inside and out. If most of the big 
players never bought physicalism, and yet young philosophers continue to be so 
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swayed by our scientistic, anti-philosophical culture that they are prepared to 
accept the scant arguments in its favour to prop up their initial prejudices, then the 
big players have not been taking the problem seriously enough. 
Physicalism is not just a false view in metaphysics, but a corrosive force 
which affects how philosophers go about their business, keeping our discipline 
insular and culturally ambiguous; hence inconspicuous and uninfluential. 
(Philosophy’s rapid cultural decline in the UK is nicely captured by a recent piece 
in the New Statesman (Herman 2017)). And yet physicalism does seem pretty 
obviously true when you start thinking about it within the context provided by our 
scientistic culture: of course science tells us the nature of everything that exists, 
and so if philosophy (whatever that is) has anything to add, it can only be at the 
fringes. Physicalism achieved its supposed hegemony with intuitions of this kind. 
In one of its most influential breakthrough papers, Smart tells us that, ‘sensations, 
states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the 
physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be 
so’ (Smart 1959: 142). Then after completing the paragraph with his reasons, he 
begins the next with, ‘The above is largely a confession of faith’ (ibid.: 143). Well 
exactly: faith in science, and a lack of faith in two-and-a-half thousand years of 
philosophy, during which physicalism, which has been around since Democritus, 
was rarely taken particularly seriously.  
What changed? What changed is that science became really impressive in the 
twentieth century and religious influence on intellectual life consequently 
declined. Little or nothing philosophically changed as regards the merits of 
physicalism. But physicalism was a scientific metaphysic, in the sense that it 
handed the central task of metaphysics to science. Religions embody a philosophy, 
so with their declining influence, philosophy was on the back foot. Not wanting 
to get caught on the declining side of the divide, it threw itself into the reluctant 
and ambivalent embrace of science; generally indifferent, sometimes encouraging, 
but more often hostile. Philosophers subsequently learned, like the rest of 
scientistic culture, to think of anything non-physical as ‘spooky’. ‘What sort of 
chemical process could lead to the springing into existence of something non-
physical?’ asked Smart. ‘No enzyme can catalyse the production of spook!’(Smart 
1963: 660). Do not get me wrong: I think Smart was probably the best philosopher 
that physicalism ever produced, for at least he was self-aware, and he did have a 
plausible theory; after Smart, physicalism ran out of those. But as soon as you 
start to reflect philosophically upon the status of the physical world, however – 
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which is what philosophy had always done prior to the advent of physicalism – 
then the notion of ‘non-physical’ takes on a whole new light. Although I would 
heavily qualify it, I am inclined to agree with Hegel that, ‘A philosophy which 
ascribed genuine, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence as such, would not 
deserve the name of philosophy’ (Hegel 1816: §316). 
These days the situation has become really extreme. In a symposium which 
Goff and I recently contributed to, Daniel Dennett says that, ‘most philosophical 
theories are just definitions defended, with no aspiration to make novel 
predictions but rather just to assign the phenomena covered by the “theory” to 
some category or other.’ (Dennett 2016: 67-8) In other words, unless you are 
looking to make ‘novel predictions’ – unless you are a scientist – then you are 
wasting your time. No more subterfuge then; the anti-philosophy that was always 
integral to physicalism is brought right into the open by this astonishing and no 
doubt heart-felt statement by Dennett. Trying to make a rational, well-argued case 
for a description of the world which satisfies human curiosity about natural 
questions such as how experience fits into the world we experience, whether we 
are free, or why the world exists – all of that is reduced to ‘definitions defended’ 
and assigning ‘the phenomena covered by the “theory” to some category or other’. 
Straight into the bin with the entire history of philosophical inquiry, says 
physicalism. It makes me proud to be writing about the meaning of life. 
Physicalism needs to perish and fast. As it gets bolder, its negligible 
philosophical foundations become more exposed; so the time is ripe. Physicalism 
may seem obvious within the context of scientistic culture, but the case against it 
can be made just as obvious with a little philosophical context. Thought 
‘experiments’, as they have come to be called, certainly have their uses; but as the 
name suggests, excessive reliance upon them is to the physicalist’s advantage. The 
instinctively physicalist philosopher can maintain their instincts in the face of 
them, so long as they are clever enough to spot a gap. Philosophical context is the 
real key, I think. Physicalism must reluctantly operate within that context, and 
when that is made clear, the arguments are stacked up against it. And with the 
metaphysic broken, as it will be, the culture that prompts it can also be broken; 
for people do remain open to philosophy, I think, on those rare occasions when 
they are still exposed to it. Philosophy could flourish during the next Roaring 
Twenties. Institutional security is no excuse for looking away from its wider 
cultural decline. 
I doubt Goff would disagree with much of what I have just said, if any of it, 
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but it does provide the essential context for my response to his paper. As I fully 
expected, his critical reading of my theory of consciousness is razor-sharp and 
always constructive. But although we have invested in different theories of 
consciousness, with consequently different ramifications for our metaphysical 
beliefs in general, we are both arguing against physicalism. I am inclined to think 
that the latter is the main thing we are doing. Of course, physicalists disagree with 
each other too – about how best to accommodate consciousness within the world-
view of physicalism – and everybody is just trying to determine the truth about 
consciousness, of course. But the situation across the physicalism / anti-
physicalism divide is highly asymmetrical.  
Physicalists have no reason to care about the particular truth their attention 
has alighted upon, namely that pertaining to consciousness. They talk about it 
because anti-physicalists do; and this because it presents an obvious problem for 
their metaphysic. I very rarely detect much, if any, metaphilosophical self-
consciousness among physicalists. When they disagree among themselves, it is 
simply a matter of disagreement over how best to bat off the latest annoying anti-
physicalist meme. The metaphysics is already settled in their minds; science 
determines that, at the end of the day. All that matters to them, within their internal 
disputes about whether or not to grant consciousness metaphysically supervenient 
or simply conceptual credit, is which tactic best silences the anti-physicalists. If 
they were to win, the only result would be an end to philosophical discussion 
about consciousness; science could take over at that point. Apart from the benefits 
to their careers of publishing on the matter, they really have nothing to win. Anti-
physicalists, on the other hand, have an extremely substantive and self-aware 
unity of purpose: that of bringing the metaphysics back to philosophy. Succeed, 
and they win the conceptual space to debate fascinating speculations about the 
ultimate nature of consciousness, such as Russellian Monism and the 
Transcendent Hypothesis, within a more self-confident, interesting and culturally 
attractive discipline. The fact that anti-physicalists have substantive metaphysical 
disagreements should not be mistaken for a disadvantage, on the grounds that they 
lack the unity of the physicalist side. It is in fact a major advantage; their 
disagreements presage the kind of fruitful debates which philosophy could be 
filled with were physicalism not holding it back, and their metaphilosophical unity 
of purpose in trying to take us to that place is far more compelling and inspiring 
than the physicalists’ metaphysical consensus. Consensus in science gets things 
done; but philosophy is not science, and excessive consensus in philosophy may 
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simply be a sign that the ideas have dried up.   
When I was reading Goff’s paper, reflections such as these kept reminding 
me of a sentence in my book which he does not mention, but which has played on 
my mind ever since I wrote it. After arguing that attempts to insert consciousness 
into the objective world inevitably result in ‘revisionism’, in that we end up trying 
to revise our conception of either experience or matter, I say that, 
 
If revisionism is necessary, then, it is Dennett who takes it in the more 
sensible direction, that is, towards experience rather than matter. (PML, p. 
100)  
 
I take this back. The reason I said it is that I do not think it is credible for 
philosophy to disagree with the characterisations of matter we receive from 
objective thought; whereas experience is prime philosophical territory. 
Philosophy must tell us about the metaphysical status of the world objective 
thought describes (to which physicalism has the simplest and most unreflective 
answer possible), but it is not within its remit to get involved in the first-order 
description itself; and any attempt to do so is liable to look ludicrous, given how 
advanced our science now is.  
I still think this, but I had not thought the matter through sufficiently, and 
hence wrote a false sentence. Given the choice between the Russellian Monist 
view that matter has an intrinsically experiential nature, and the eliminativist view 
of Dennett that we are not conscious, but rather falsely judge that we are, then the 
former is infinitely more sensible. This is because, on the eliminative view, you 
and I are simply not here to do any judging. In Meaningless, I reluctantly reached 
the conclusion that eliminative physicalism ‘could still be true’ (PML, p. 95), 
despite the incredible unlikelihood of its actually being true, given both the nature 
of the proposal and the thoroughly dubious motivations for it. Since then I have 
been circling around this idea (Tartaglia 2016 and 2017). I now see that it could 
not be true. For even if our conception of conscious experience is all wrong about 
its nature, it must at least be right that it has a nature, and that as such, people have 
what we naturally think of as a subjective outlook on the world. Within the 
exclusively objective metaphysic of physicalism, this could not be the case. Their 
conception of what it means for something to seem to be the case, which is that 
the objective conditions for representing it to be the case are met, can only be true 
of conscious beings, for whom a world is present, if at least one element of the 
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representation is correct: namely that there is something that conscious beings are 
representing as ‘the presence of the world’. This cannot be something objective, 
otherwise this element of the representation would not be correct. The equivalent 
representation had by a non-conscious being could indeed be all wrong. ‘They’ 
could ‘token’ this representation in the ‘face of’ nothing at all. 
My mistake was to overlook the metaphilosophical unity of anti-physicalism, 
and focus instead on the kind of metaphysical discussions that anti-physicalists 
can currently only presage. Within a metaphysic in which consciousness is 
assured, then I do indeed think it is considerably more sensible to distrust our 
conception of experience than our conception of matter. Revision is indeed 
required, to some extent, and I think physicalists have hit upon some sound 
insights in this area. But when revisionism is adopted simply in order to sure up 
the world-view of physicalism, which is the context in which I made my 
unfortunate statement, then there is no contest. Revise experience to make 
physicalism work, and consciousness disappears; so the result is the absurd 
spectacle of conscious people trying their damnedest to genuinely believe that 
they are not conscious. If in order to avoid this outcome you feel the need to revise 
our conception of the objective world – by inserting some objective subjectivity 
into the middle of it – then that is obviously the way to go. I do not agree with this 
way of doing it, I do not think you have to do it, and I am quite sure that it is a 
dire mistake to call the result a new and improved form of ‘materialism’ – as Galen 
Strawson does (2008), but Goff does not, despite the affinity of their positions – 
but nevertheless, the outcome is what matters. 
Now in a sense, I have already suggested my answer to the overarching 
concern of Goff’s paper, namely that there is a tension between my arguments 
against physicalist approaches to consciousness in Chapter 4 of Meaningless, and 
my positive account of consciousness in Chapter 5. When I am criticising 
physicalism, my point is that our conception of consciousness is much richer than 
physicalists can allow, since it conflicts with what they want to tell us 
consciousness really is. When I am subsequently presenting my own theory, I 
argue that this rich conception misrepresents the true reality of consciousness. 
What makes it coherent to argue in both of these ways is my view that the rich 
misrepresentation does not have it completely wrong: for it is a conception of 
something. For physicalists, however, it must be completely wrong: a conception 
of nothing at all. This is entirely in line with my general view that we cannot 
positively characterise transcendent reality, but nevertheless cannot deny its 
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reality. Compare, for instance, my argument in Chapter 6 that we have a 
transcendent notion of ‘now’, which inserts us into the flow of time, but which 
creates nothing but illusion when we try to make sense of it with the only 
substantive resources we have, namely those of objective thought. This was the 
direction of travel in the chapters on consciousness. 
Physicalists, before they reach the inevitable, eliminative terminus of their 
position – a terminus most remain unaware of – want our conception of 
consciousness to be anodyne, not rich, because then they have a chance of arguing 
that the anodyne features it ascribes latch onto something physical. I argued that 
as a matter of fact, our conception is not anodyne, but rather squarely incompatible 
with physicalism. But when physicalists do reach the eliminative terminus, it 
becomes irrelevant to them how rich our conception of consciousness is, because 
now they have seen the implication of their position that it is an entirely illusory 
conception. They are wrong, however, because it must at least refer to something, 
given that we are all here, thinking the matter over. Within my own account, I 
accept that the objective world is centreless, as the eliminativists recognise, 
together with the fact that our conception of consciousness is a conception of 
something, which the eliminativists try in vain to dispute – and this leaves me at 
liberty to reflect on the erroneous nature of the rich conception we possess. Rich 
and erroneous for the same reason: namely that it derives from objective thought, 
which is rich and centreless. 
Although I think concepts of conscious experiences are rich 
misrepresentations, the accurate representation at the heart of them can be thought 
of as ‘blind-pointer-type concepts’, as Goff puts it (p. 25). Goff thinks I reject all 
such concepts in Chapter 4 and then end up re-affirming them in Chapter 5. This 
is what he says, 
 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that proper names refer in virtue 
of a causal connection between the name and the referent, rather than in 
virtue of an associated description. A school child can refer to ‘Galileo’ 
without knowing anything about him (perhaps they mistakenly think he was 
a famous explorer), which shows that they can’t be picking him out in terms 
of any of his characteristics. The child manages to pick out Galileo because 
they use a term, i.e. ‘Galileo’, which is causally connected in the right kind 
of way with Galileo himself. This story seems to me fairly plausible, and it 
suggests that the concept expressed by a proper name is a kind of blind 
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pointer.  
I think it’s better to say, not that there are no blind-pointer-type concepts, 
but simply that it’s pretty implausible that experiential concepts are blind-
pointer-type concepts. When I think about pain in terms of how it feels, I 
know something about its essential nature. That’s what prompts my concern 
when others feel pain; I know what pain is, and hence I know it’s a terrible 
thing to endure. We might bolster this claim with reference to Tartaglia’s 
claim that we characterise experiences as self-aware states: to characterise 
a state as self-aware is to have a positive conception of it, not just to blindly 
point at it. (pp. 24-5) 
 
I have been deeply suspicious of Kripke’s causal theory of reference ever since I 
read Rorty’s critique of it (Rorty 1979: chapter 6; esp. pp. 284-95). To have a 
conception of something is to have a way of thinking about it. If a child thinks 
Galileo was a famous explorer, and nothing more, does the child have a way of 
thinking about that man? It seems to me that they know the name, but not what it 
stands for; and hence that they cannot have acquired a way of thinking about what 
it stands for. Since others know the name too, the child can use it to refer to 
Galileo; when the child says the name, others start thinking about Galileo 
according to their own conceptions of him. But the child has a conception of a 
famous explorer called ‘Galileo’, and there was no such person. Causal links 
within society may explain the child’s ability to use that name to refer to Galileo, 
but they cannot provide the child with a way of thinking about somebody they 
know nothing about. The causal links are epistemically nothing to the child; and 
the child’s ability to make a certain sound provides them with no cognitive grasp 
on the nature of the object that the sound conventionally stands for either.  
The reason I do not think this child has a blind-pointer-type-concept, is that 
they do have an idea of what they want to point to; and it is wrong. No doubt they 
also want to point to the standard bearer of the name (that is why it is wrong), but 
they lack the cognitive resources to do so. If they try on their own to think about 
Galileo, then they fail, by thinking about some explorer. (Perhaps ‘some man in 
the olden days called “Galileo”’ is good enough, but I am inclined to think that 
the more explicit content cancels this out; and in any case, you could easily adjust 
the example.) Thus it seems natural to me to say that they lack a concept of Galileo. 
The case of experiential concepts is different, however, because what we are 
trying to think about is right up against our faces, so to speak. We are trying to 
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think about that. In such cases, we cannot fail to have concepts of something 
which we are trying to make sense of with the concepts. These concepts are rich, 
so the pre-eliminative physicalist positions cannot be right. But they have blind-
pointer-type-concepts at their heart, surrounded by the rich misrepresentation that 
makes the concepts useful to us, so the eliminative physicalist position cannot be 
right either. 
The main point of contention between Goff and myself is over the question 
of whether our rich conceptions of conscious states get them right or not; he thinks 
they do and I do not. As he neatly puts it, the issue is over the ‘epistemic priority 
of phenomenal properties over external properties’ or vice versa (p. 27). For me, 
phenomenal concepts are shadows of concepts of external properties, but Goff 
thinks it can be the other way around. In response to my arguments that whenever 
we form a positive, phenomenal conception of our experiences, we end up relying 
upon features from the objective world which experiences cannot possess, he says 
that, 
 
Phenomenal colour and phenomenal shape represent their external 
analogues: when I see a tomato I have an experience which represents a red, 
round thing at a certain distance from me. But I see no reason to doubt that 
there is ‘mental paint’ doing the representing, mental paint with an intrinsic 
character known through introspection. We call a certain intrinsic property 
of experience ‘phenomenal colour’ because it represents phenomenal 
colour, and another intrinsic property of experience ‘phenomenal shape’ 
because it represents phenomenal shape. (p. 26) 
 
He supports this with the suggestion that my case draws support from an 
equivocation over the meaning of ‘objective’: ‘Experiences are not “objective” in 
the sense that they are subjective properties, i.e. properties which characterise the 
subjective experience of an individual. But they are perfectly “objective” in the 
sense that the facts about experience are perfectly objective facts about reality’ (p. 
28). 
I take the point that if there were subjective properties captured by 
phenomenal concepts, then they would be just as objective as everything else, in 
the sense that within any given time-slice of reality, subjective properties would 
number among the properties that exist. But that is not how I use ‘objective’, 
because I do not find the terminology useful in this context. Used in this way, 
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‘objective’ means something like ‘independently existing’; but then it cannot quite 
mean that because the existence of subjective properties depends on a subject 
experiencing them – unless you are the kind of panpsychist who denies this. And 
since you might reasonably think that no property exists independently, you may 
as well just say that subjective properties exist. So rather than unnecessarily 
muddy the waters, when I say ‘objective’, I mean having the properties 
characteristic of physical objects, such as size, shape, colour, density, and so on, 
plus the less obvious characteristics which science invokes to better explain them.  
Now I perfectly understand, I think, where Goff is coming from on this issue 
of epistemic priority. He thinks that conscious experience is our epistemic point 
of contact with the world, and that it was on the basis of the ‘mental paint’ of 
consciousness that we drew up our more abstract conceptions of size, shape and 
other external qualities. In a sense, then, I am bound to agree; I defend an indirect 
conception of perceptual experience. However, it seems to me that our original 
experience of the world was just that: of the world. We thought of our conscious 
experience as trees, animals, etc., and formed conceptions of those things. 
Developing such conceptions has ultimately led to the incredibly rich picture of 
an objective world which we now have. Reflection, however, taught us that this 
completely transparent conception of experience is philosophically naïve and 
unsustainable, and that to produce a coherent and complete picture of reality, 
which includes many ‘things’ we experience which are not things at all, we need 
to think of the things we conceive of objectively as external causes of the states 
of conscious experience which represent them. We needed an indirect conception 
of experience, to account for both the existence of experience and its causal 
integration with the world. But when we try to conceive the experiences 
themselves, and not just what they are experiences of, we have no new concepts 
to hand. We have to employ the concepts we developed for making sense of the 
external world; and when we look at the phenomenal concepts we actually have, 
it seems to me that this is exactly what we find. 
When we started saying that sounds were vibrations in the air, or that colours 
were light-reflectancies of surfaces, I do not think we were overlooking the mental 
paint, and trying to pretend it does not exist in the service of an impoverished, 
purely extrinsic conception of reality, as I think Goff does. There is definitely 
something to this, in the sense that we favoured anything that fitted our scientific 
theories, and looked away from the rest. But what I think was really happening is 
that we were refining our objective conceptions. We always thought, except in our 
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philosophical moments, that the sound, e.g., was ‘something out there’; and we 
found a better way of describing what it was. It was a description of the ‘mental 
paint’, except we were not thinking of it as mental, but rather external. When the 
philosophical need to describe what independently exists arose, we realised that 
the vibrations in the air could only be the causes of internal experience. But when 
we came to describe that internal experience, we had no new resources. All we 
could do was fall back on the less objectively accurate concepts we had before – 
‘the sound of a trumpet’, rather than ‘certain vibrations in the air’, for instance – 
and then assure ourselves that the former, and not the latter, captured the 
phenomenal nature of the experience. We knew experience could not be nothing 
at all and we felt we should be able to say something about it; so we enlisted the 
older objective concepts and starting talking about phenomenal ineffability. 
If we ‘call a certain intrinsic property of experience “phenomenal colour” 
because it represents phenomenal colour,’ then we end up with the mental paint 
representing itself; physicalists typically find themselves relying on this kind of 
idea too. It strikes me as untenable, since our notion of representation is of one 
thing representing another. More strongly, I think it is incoherent; and I have an 
analysis of where I think the deep-rooted incoherence lies (PML, chapter 7; esp. 
pp. 156-62). A much better plan, it seems to me, is to say that when we represent 
an experience as possessed of phenomenal colour, we represent it in accordance 
with the way we represent things in the objective world. The incoherence is still 
there, because we do also represent experiences as self-aware; but now that we 
are explaining a feature of misrepresentation, rather than a supposed feature of 
reality, it no longer matters.   
Further light is shed on our disagreement about epistemic priority, when Goff 
says, 
 
It is a familiar point that experiential qualities are in some sense ineffable. 
But this is plausibly due to the fact that the concepts we use to pick them 
out are primitive. Compare to other plausibly primitive concepts: existence, 
metaphysical possibility, causation, the notion of a reason. It is arguable 
that none of these notions can be explained in more basic terms. 
 
He goes on to say that,  
 
The nature is known, but it is known only through actually having the 
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experience itself. If you have to ask, you’ll never know. (pp. 27-8) 
 
‘What is swing?’ Fats Waller was once asked, and his reply was: ‘Lady, if you 
have to ask, don’t fool with it!’ (Terkel 2002: 72). Ned Block once attributed a 
similar line to Louis Armstrong, related it to the ineffability of phenomenal 
consciousness, and it subsequently went viral in philosophy; Goff was giving it a 
nod with his final sentence above. Well, if the lady in question did have to ask, 
then Fats was surely right that swinging was never going to be her thing. But 
although musicians who know how to swing are unlikely to know how they do it, 
that does not mean nothing can be said about it. I can swing; and although I do 
not know much about it (except in the ability sense), I do know a little. A lot of it 
comes down to adjusting the lengths of the quavers in accordance with the tempo; 
in jazz, contiguous pairs of these are, as a rule of thumb, divided two-thirds to 
one-third, but when the tempo goes up, this gradually gets closer to half and half. 
There is a lot more to it than that, of course, and you do not need to know even 
this to instinctively swing (thank God). But my point is that an awful lot could be 
said about it, and no doubt already has. In principle, you could take the styles of 
the greatest swingers apart, and show exactly what they are doing in 
excruciatingly dull detail.  
The situation with phenomenal consciousness is not remotely like this, so I 
do not think the analogy is a good one. Neither do I think it a tactically good idea 
for anti-physicalists to rely on ineffability intuitions; they are an obvious weak 
point, and quite unnecessary – not to mention misleading, to my mind. It is not 
that there is no need to get explicit about phenomenal consciousness and that it is 
better that we do not, as is the case with swing. The fact is that we simply cannot 
get explicit about it without talking in terms we have evidently borrowed from the 
objective world. The colour was really intense, says the introspecter; the light was 
really intense, says the scientist, etc. That we can get explicit right up until the 
point at which we feel the need to say something different about phenomenal 
colour to what we say about objective colour, strongly suggests to me that we are 
not dealing with one of Goff’s primitive concepts. Now you could think it is the 
other way around, in that our conceptions of the objective world come from our 
conceptions of experiences. And in terms of the metaphysics of what is actually 
going on, on both my account and Goff’s, it amounts to the same thing in at least 
the following sense: that we are conceptualising the same thing, whether we take 
ourselves to be conceptualising consciousness itself or the world which it makes 
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us aware of. However, it is not the same in the sense of what we take ourselves to 
be conceptualising; and outside of philosophy, it seems clear to me that we have 
taken ourselves to be conceptualising the world – which is why we have been so 
successful in developing the concepts of objective thought. In this sense, then, 
they are concepts of external properties, and hence this is where the epistemic 
priority lies. 
Various considerations convince me that this is the right order of priority, but 
the main one is the need to account for the ‘split-level’ nature of consciousness. 
The idea, which I learnt from J. J. Valberg’s ‘horizonal’ conception of 
consciousness (Valberg 2007), is that consciousness places us within a world from 
the perspective of which whatever reality there is to consciousness itself is to be 
found outside of that world. I do not think that Russellian monism, dualism, or 
any of the other alternatives to physicalism, outside of idealist and 
phenomenological traditions, account for that insight; an insight which I think is 
entirely sound. Once you accept it, it makes perfect sense that concepts of what 
appear within consciousness will have epistemic priority; Valberg himself does 
not even allow for specifically phenomenal concepts of that which appears within 
consciousness, but I do think we have them – as shadows (see my exchange with 
Valberg; this symposium). Once you look at things this way, then there is no 
longer see any reason to entertain doubts about the picture of the world-within-
consciousness which objective thought presents. Objective concepts are fine for 
objective purposes, and the fact that when you try to make a metaphysic out of 
this world you will find no room for conscious experience, is exactly what you 
would expect; the main problem for physicalist metaphysics is predicted and 
explained, without the need to criticise objective thought itself. And for all Goff 
says about Russellian Monism not being in competition with science (pp. 31-2) – 
which I accept – I still think that to say that science leaves out the intrinsic nature 
of the matter it describes, sounds like a criticism. On my view, describing matter 
is their business alone; metaphysically interpreting that description is ours. 
Now add in some metaphilosophical considerations about the connection 
between consciousness and transcendence, which I think explain why the issue 
has attracted so much philosophical attention, and which ties it in with a plausible 
account of philosophical inquiry in general. Add in the straightforward 
plausibility of the idea that the independent nature of reality outruns any 
description human beings can give of it, except when we retreat to some of the 
emptiest concepts we have, which lack the detail, and hence usefulness, of the 
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objective thought we developed because of its usefulness. Put all of that together, 
and I think we have an attractive package. Goff’s alternative has a powerful idea 
behind it which I cannot lay claim to, namely that objective thought is merely 
extrinsic and relational, thereby leaving an obvious gap when it comes to the 
intrinsic. But all things considered, I think that extrinsic characterisation is all we 
can do when we want to say something substantive – basically, relate things to 
each other; and Goff’s appeal to ineffability confirms me in this view. The 
intrinsicality gap is a natural enough place to insert the fact that we are conscious. 
But if you do it this way, you do not account for the distinctive structure of 
conscious experience, and end up placing consciousness in the objective world, 
rather than the objective world within consciousness; from the introspective 
perspective we must apply to think about consciousness, this is clearly the wrong 
way around. Consciousness ends up ineffable, but also extremely well-known to 
us, such that despite the fact that we know it spatially, for instance, we cannot 
employ this spatial knowledge to say the substantive things we normally would, 
e.g. that the experience is large with rounded edges. Better to leave objective 
thought alone, I think, while granting that it provides us with useful 
misrepresentations when we need to talk about individual experiences. 
Goff asks, 
  
Why do I need to make sense of experience in terms of objective thought? 
Why can’t I form a perfectly adequate conception just by conceiving of my 
experience in terms of what it’s like to have it? It seems that I can entertain 
the possibility of solipsism – the hypothesis that all that exists is myself and 
my mental properties – and in doing so I think about my experience without 
bringing in the idea of anything from the external world. Why is this not a 
perfectly adequate conception of my own experiences? (pp. 29-30) 
 
I agree that you could, but your conceptions of your own experiences will have to 
be rooted in the idea that it is as if they were caused by external conditions. 
Otherwise you will not be able to make sense of their succession. As such, you 
will be leaning on objective thought. You may disavow it, by saying that it is only 
as if your blue experience has rounded edges; as everyone does when they turn to 
the phenomenal conception. But since you will not be able to say anything 
positive about the blueness itself, and anything substantive you might want to say, 
such as about what seems to cause the blue experience, will be disavowed, then 
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everything that makes your conception adequate is being disavowed. Such a 
disavowal strikes me as hollow, unless made within a context which explains the 
status of objective thought within the context of consciousness, and thereby 
explains why we cannot say anything positive about the blueness itself.  
Goff goes on to point out an affinity between the Phenomenal Concept 
Strategy and my take on both Jackson’s Mary-in-the-room and the Farrell / Nagel 
bat. I very nearly passed over these examples, which have been unremittingly 
flogged for decades, on the grounds that they have clearly failed to do their job, 
and hence are very unlikely to ever do so now; but I am glad I did not, given that 
what I said caught Goff’s attention. He is right about the affinity; I spent so long 
trying to work out what was wrong with the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, that I 
eventually found the positive aspect within it that had maintained my attention. 
The Strategy appeals to physicalists, because it shows them a way to use Kripke’s 
causal theory to argue that phenomenal concepts are blind demonstratives; being 
blind, they could refer to anything whatsoever, which is just what the physicalist 
needs. I affirm this aspect of the view, like them, to explain why Mary learns 
something new when she leaves the black-and-white room, and why we do not 
know what it is like to be a bat. To this, Goff understandably asks, ‘Given that 
Tartaglia also thinks of experiential concepts as demonstratives which leave us in 
the dark about the nature of experience, how can he be so confident that 
experience doesn’t have a purely physical nature?’ (pp. 30-1). 
I have already answered this: the reason I can be so confident, is that if 
experience did have a purely physical nature, then it would be objective, and so 
no experiential field would open up from individual, subjective perspectives, such 
that our blind demonstratives have something to hit. No introspective 
demonstrative reference would be taking place; rather Mary, or the bat, would just 
be making noises – or computing in a manner appropriate to the emission of such 
noises. Consciousness would not present a world; rather an objective world would 
simply exist. And unless consciousness presents a world, our awareness of this 
fact cannot lead us to form the metaphysical intention to refer to the ultimate 
nature of that presentation, thereby making the demonstratives a little less blind.  
By leaning on objective thought, we form phenomenal concepts of distinct, 
individual experiences. Reflection on the transcendence of consciousness teaches 
us both that these concepts cannot be capturing their real natures, and that they 
must have a real nature. We point outside the horizon of consciousness, just as 
within a dream we might point outside of the dream to where the real existence 
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lies. We know that our conceptions formed within the context of consciousness 
cannot capture what we are pointing at, but we also know that these conceptions 
are of different experiences, because leaning on objective thought distinguishes 
them for us. Since objective thought cannot capture the demonstrate component, 
learning about what it has to say cannot provide us with these concepts; so when 
we gain one, we learn something new: what it is like. What we learn may be 
entirely illusory outside the context of consciousness – we have no reason to think 
that we are marking real distinctions, although I grant that it is very tempting to 
think this – but within the context, we learn something both practically 
informative, and philosophically, highly suggestive. 
Goff closes his paper by pointing out how very quick my rejection of dualism 
is, and how it presupposes the standard ‘causal closure’ line of physicalists. About 
this, he says, 
 
If the physical world is causally closed, then there is no space for the mind 
to do any causal work by making changes in the brain. However, although 
often stated the causal closure of the physical is not often defended with 
empirical argument. It would be nice to hear a little bit more from Tartaglia 
of the case for causal closure. (p. 32) 
 
He is quite right. The closure argument is far from water-tight, and I have nothing 
to say in response to the sophisticated objections that have been brought against 
it by Goff and others. My stance towards the causal closure argument is rather 
apathetic: I am prepared to give that one to the physicalists – although Goff may 
well be right that anti-physicalists should not. The reason for my apathy is that I 
am already convinced, from reflection on the structure of consciousness, that the 
right place to look for consciousness is not the objective world. As such, I have 
no reason to suspect that objective thought would not be capable of describing a 
perfectly closed system; except for general suspicion about the limitations of 
science, which seems less compelling with each passing decade.  
The closure argument would, if it were any good, reinforce my view that 
interactionist dualism makes a similar mistake to physicalism; inserting 
consciousness into the objective order, and thereby becoming forced to say that 
the brain is metaphysically special, rather than an ordinary object. But then, I 
would think that anyway. What really interests me is the fact that it is the main 
argument which physicalism relies upon. And yet it only has any force against 
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interactionist dualism. My tactic was to point out that since I am not an 
interactionist dualist – and the vast majority of anti-physicalists, past and present, 
have not been – then I simply do not care about that argument. They can have it; 
if it works, it can only reinforce what I am saying. If I keep saying things like this, 
and Goff continues to make the case that even this argument – the one which is 
supposed to provide the physicalist’s strongest ground – is actually a rather 
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